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17 December 1960

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# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE


# BULLETIN



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

17 December 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: On 16 December the USSR launched what is believed to be a large supersonic aerodynamic vehicle called Hotcross in the intelligence community. The last test of such a vehicle took place on 23 March. The latest vehicle was launched from Vladimirovka and was apparently programed to fly to the Kamchatka impact area of the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range. In the three previous transcontinental tests, the Hotcross vehicles were also scheduled to fly to Kamchatka: two are known to have crashed en route; the third possibly completed its flight. According to preliminary analysis

the vehicle traveled 2,800 nautical miles and may have reached its apparent destination near Klyuchi, a distance of about 4,000 nautical miles. The vehicle flew at an altitude of approximately 65,000 feet and at speeds of 1,600 to 1,800 knots, conforming to performance characteristics of Hotcross observed to date. The role of the Hotcross vehicle is not known, but it is estimated that such a vehicle could be employed for weapon delivery, reconnaissance, or for investigation of problem areas related to high-speed flight.

North Vietnam - South Vietnam: The Vietnamese Communists have designated 20 December as the date for publicizing the establishment of a united front throughout South Vietnam,


This move will

be a dramatic advance in Hanoi's two-pronged campaign to topple the Diem regime, combining stepped-up guerrilla activity with political agitation among elements opposed to

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President Diem. The Communists in the South, acting on orders from North Vietnam, appear to be trying to exploit the widespread non-Communist dissatisfaction with the government evidenced by the abortive coup of 11 November.

(Page 1)

### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Somali Republic - Communist China: Prime Minister Abdirascid announced in the Somali parliament on 14 December that his government had decided to recognize Communist China and exchange diplomatic representatives. The decision, the result of an assiduous campaign by Peiping in competition with Nationalist China reportedly was made following a recent conversation between Abdirascid and the Chinese Communist ambassador in Cairo. An official Chinese delegation reportedly is to visit Mogadiscio in the pear future.

Iran: The Shah of Iran hopes to begin parliamentary elections within the next ten days. He plans to allow voters a choice between at least two contenders for each seat and he will personally select the candidates. The Shah intends to order local authorities not to manipulate the voting on behalf of their favorites. It is unlikely that such an order would be followed. Public knowledge of the wholesale rigging of last August's elections forced the Shah to suspend them. A new electoral fiasco could cause public disturbances. (Page 2)

Congo: The pro-Lumumba regime at Stanleyville has not yet taken any action against Europeans there; it is mainly concerned with preparations to meet a possible attack by the Congo Army.

in adjoining Equateur Province, "from 1,000 to 1,300 men have been called to military service in Stanleyville," presumably in addition to pro-Lumumba militia who have controlled the city. In Leopoldville, Congo Army commanders and key staff officers down to the battalion level have been called together by Mobutu.

17 Dec 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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possibly to discuss military action against the dissidents.

Recent overtures by Ghanaian President Nkrumah concerning an African army to restore Lumumba to power in the Congo appear to have stimulated little enthusiasm among neutralist Afro-Asian states. Although some form of military consultative arrangement may be agreed upon among Ghana, Guinea, Sudan, and the UAR, the government press in Cairo has emphasized that the UAR has "its own plans" for combating "foreign aggression" in Africa. (Page 3)

\*Ethiopia: Troops loyal to the Emperor have regained almost complete control of Addis Ababa, and the coup attempt apparently has collapsed. Loyalists have freed the crown prince and other officials who were being held in the palace. Most of the dissidents are at large in the Addis Ababa area. The army reportedly has issued orders for the arrest of the ringleaders, including Bodyguard commander General Menghistou, Director of Security Workeneh, and Germami Neway, Menghistou's brother, who reportedly was the behind-the-scenes leader of the dissidents. The Emperor, who landed in Asmara on the afternoon of 16 December, can be expected to impose severe punishment on all those involved in the coun.

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### III. THE WEST

Italy: Political tensions are rising as the Christian Democrats are negotiating for allies outside the four parties supporting the government; only with such alliances will they be able to govern key cities where the four parties do not have a majority following the local elections on 6 and 7 November. The Christian Democrats are playing down the national political significance of the local collaboration with the Nenni Socialists which is urged by the government's moderate left supporters. Opposition by right-wing Christian Democrats and

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17 Dec 60

DAILY BRIEF

iii

Liberals to such collaboration could build up p	ressures
leading to the fall of Fanfani's government.	
(Page 5)	

Ecuador: Ecuador's pro-Castro anti-US minister of government—the principal exponent of pro-bloc policies within the government pro-bloc policies pro-bloc policies within the government pro-bloc policies pro-bloc policies within the cabinet had secretly decided to establish relations with the USSR. Three days earlier Foreign Minister Chiriboga had announced that Ecuador and Czechoslovakia would soon exchange diplomatic missions of legation rank. President Velasco told Ambassador Bernbaum on 14 December that while Ecuador is willing to establish relations with the USSR, he will neither take the initiative nor yield to domestic pressures for close ties with the bloc or withdrawal from the Organization of American States. (OAS).

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## IV. SPECIAL WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings of a Special Watch Committee Meeting on 16 December 1960 concerning developments relating to Laos, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

The recent developments in Laos have undoubtedly forced the Communists to review their tactics and immediate objectives.

Such evidence as we have to date regarding Communist intentions is susceptible of two interpretations:

Ca. A decision to rely on the Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces, with such increased assistance as is required in materiel and

17 Dec 60

DAILY BRIEF

iv

TOP SECRET

selected personnel, to prevent the Phoumi - Boun Oum forces from establishing effective control of Laos;

(b. A decision to intervene openly with Democratic Republic of Vietnam or Chinese Communist forces.)

The course of action "a" would not only advance Communist interests in Laos but would also allow full opportunity for attempting to isolate and discredit the US. Although the evidence better supports the adoption of course "a," open intervention under course "b" is not precluded even though such a course might involve substantial risks to the bloc.

### LATE ITEM

\*Laos: The bloc continues its threatening propaganda
line charging US and Thai "interference" in Laos. The bloc
airlift also continued unabated through 16 December; a total
of 37 Sino-Soviet transports are now involved in this operation. In Vientiane, some Phoumi forces apparently have occupied the airfield, while other elements are continuing their
attempts to clear the town of remaining pockets of resistance.

(Page 6)

17 Dec 60

DAILY BRIEF

v

# North Vietnam - South Vietnam

North Vietnam - South Vietnam
The Vietnamese Communists have designated 20 December as the date for publicizing the establishment of a united front throughout South Vietnam.
widespread circulation of a printed proclamation to be followed by demonstrations, meetings, and dissemination of propaganda leaflets and banners. These activities are directed toward "mobilizing thoroughly" all segments of the South Vietnamese population, including government and army personnel.
Although the Communists are confident that their control in some areas is sufficiently secure to permit open establishment of local front committees, the directive cautions that "the situation is still fraught with many difficulties." Aware that the Diem government is likely to take reprisals against any persons who can be identified with the movement, it warns against identifying the front with "the name of the party" and appears to postpone the selection of members of the front's central committee.
Although apparently caught by surprise when a coup attempt was made against Diem on 11 November, the Communists now appear to be moving rapidly to exploit the widespread non-Communist dissatisfaction evidenced at that time.  Communists in the South to cultivate opposition elements involved in the coup.
Hanoi has embarked on a two-pronged campaign to topple the Diem regime, combining stepped-up guerrilla activities with political agitation among non-Communist opposition groups in South Vietnam. In September Le Duan, Ho Chi Minh's top lieutenant in party affairs, called for a broadly based united front south of the 17th parallel and indicated that Hanoi believed dissatisfaction in the South was sufficiently widespread to permit enlarging the "reunification struggle" beyond the stage of purely guerrilla warfare.

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## Iranian Elections Scheduled to Begin Next Week

The Shah

hopes to begin parliamentary elections within the next ten days. He plans to allow voters a choice between at least two contenders for each seat, but will personally select the candidates, thus ensuring a parliament responsive to his demands. The Shah claims he will not attempt to assure the victory of any particular individual or party, and he intends to order local authorities not to influence voting on behalf of their favorites. It seems unlikely that many local officials will refrain from manipulating the voting, but the Shah may hope to avoid the obvious involvement of central government officials.

Premier Sharif-Emami and Interior Minister Alavi-Moqadam are urging the Shah totallow an unrestricted number of independents to stand for election. They believe that if no party wins a clear majority, their chances of retaining office will be increased. Allahyer Saleh, a prominent independent who is distrusted by the Shah for his popularity and past association with former Premier Mossadeq, apparently will be permitted to run. Former Premier Eqbal, who was forced to resign last August over election scandals, is actively leading the Melliyun party in the hope of again becoming premier.

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The Situation in the Congo
The pro-Lumumba regime at Stanleyville has not yet taken any action against Europeans there; it is mainly concerned with preparations to meet a possible attack by the Congo Army. Although Ethiopian troops of the UN Command have been concentrated in Stanleyville, concern for Europeans outside the provincial capital has prompted the UN to maintain units in the towns of Bunia, Buta, and Paulis.
in Equateur
Province, "from 1,000 to 1,300 men have been called to mil-
itary service in Stanleyville," presumably in addition to the
pro-Lumumba militia who have controlled the city since late
September. Although the dissidents have sought to extend their influence outside Orientale Province, their present disposition
appears defensive.
Recent overtures by Ghanaian President Nkrumah concerning an African army to restore Lumumba to power in the Congo appear to have stimulated little enthusiasm among neutralist African states. The government press in Cairo has emphasized that the UAR has "its own plans" for combating "foreign aggression" in Africa, but some form of military consultative arrangement may be agreed upon among Ghana, Guinea, Sudan, and the UAR. Cairo may confine its aid to the dissidents to financial assistance and military equipment, notwithstanding Gizenga's recent appeal for troops.
There are indications, however, that Gizenga's claim to represent the legal Congo government may bear fruit in terms of diplomatic recognition by a few countries
with Lumumba in prison, Gizenga can be assumed to be acting premier.
The USSR appears to be awaiting the outcome of developments affecting the Stanleyville group and the attitude of

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African and Asian countries toward Gizenga's "government." Radio Moscow reported that Gizenga had assumed responsibility and moved the seat of government to Stanleyville, but the USSR has not yet explicitly recognized his regime. Moscow is continuing its efforts to rally opposition by Afro-Asian
In Leopoldville, Congo Army commanders and key staff officers down to the battalion level gathered on 14 December at Mobutu's call, apparently for a major council of war. The meeting was characterized as one "to establish goals and means," presumably with respect to Stanleyville. Mobutu's deputy chief of staff indicated that units stationed in Orientale Province had not been invited, partly because their loyalty was suspect and partly because of the transportation problem involved.

The Christian Democrats are now negotiating for new local allies because the 6-7 November local elections in many cities, including Rome, Milan, Genoa, Turin, Venice, and Florence, failed to give a majority to either the coalition supporting the national government--Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Republicans, and Liberals--or to the Nenni Socialists and Communists. The Christian Democratic party is pledged not to form municipal governments with the Communists or neo-Fascists, and one or the other of its various factions opposes any nationwide collaboration with the Nenni Socialists or with the Monarchists, who have too few city council seats to offer important municipal solutions on a large scale.

Christian Democratic party leaders are anxious to play down the significance of local commitments to the Nenni Socialists because of the implications such commitments would have for the national government. Apprehension on the part of the Liberal party lest the national government rely on Nenni Socialist parliamentary support led to the collapse of the Segni government in February 1960. The extent of Christian Democratic collaboration with the Socialists in municipal councils may therefore determine the life of the Fanfani coalition.

Nenni is stressing the significance of local agreements, however, in order to convince his own party's left wing that his policy of independence of the Communists is paying off. Nenni and his supporters fear that failure to achieve alliances with the Christian Democrats in important cities would hurt him visavis the Socialist left wing at the March party congress. He has been pressing for collaboration in the Sicilian regional government with the Christian Democrats, who now participate with the neo-Fascists and Monarchists.

Meanwhile the Communists are attempting to draw the Socialists back into united action by exploiting a series of strikes in the railway and industrial sectors. Additional strikes are threatened by teachers, newsmen, and shopkeepers. The strikes are based on economic issues, and not only the Communist-dominated CGIL but the largely Christian Democratic and Social Democratic unions have participated in most of them.

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### Situation in Laos

The bloc continues its threatening propaganda line charging US and Thai "interference" in Laos. A Moscow Home Service broadcast of 15 December attacked "American imperialists" as bearing full responsibility for the Laotian crisis. The broadcast warned that US interference in Laos was "provoking a wide military conflict" and promised a "clean sweep of the transatlantic interventionists." Communist China's People's Daily stated on 16 December that the Laotian people "are not alone," and North Korea issued an official statement on 15 December charging the US with "a flagrant violation" of the Geneva agreements on Indochina and with creating a "grave threat to the peace of the world." North Vietnam continues to describe the Laotian situation in terms of "a direct threat to the DRV."

The bloc justifies its actions in Laos by insisting that
Souvanna Phouma still heads the legal government. In a
move possibly intended to sound out the Burmese position
on this subject,
called on a Burmese official on 15 December to
state Hanoi's view on Souvanna and to inform the Burmese
that North Vietnam wanted a political solution in Laos. The
North Vietnamese diplomat stated that Souvanna was the only individual qualified to form a coalition government.
state Hanoi's view on Souvanna and to inform the Burmese that North Vietnam wanted a political solution in Laos. The North Vietnamese diplomat stated that Souvanna was the only

The North Vietnamese recently withdrew transportation from the ICC inspection teams at Haiphong and Vinh in North Vietnam. The US Embassy in Saigon suggests this move may be intended to hamper observation of military movements. In view of the supply lift to North Vietnam, the Canadian ICC delegation for Vietnam has requested urgent ICC consideration of apparent violation of the Geneva agreements. A special meeting will take up this question on 20 December.

The bloc airlift in support of the Pathet Lao continued unabated through 16 December. Apart from the five Soviet IL-14s

which were reflected in flight to Vientiane on To December, two AN-2s, one LI-2, and one MI-4 helicopter-all probably North Vietnamese-were scheduled to fly on 15 December, probably to the Sam Neua area. Several additional Chinese Communist transports subordinate to the 3rd Independent Regiment and two of naval subordination have joined the 17 transports of the 13th Air Division in airlift operations to Nanning. There are now a total of 37 Sino-Soviet transports involved in airlift operations. Some of the 3rd Independent Regiment transports have been noted in flight from Peiping to Hanoi. Also, three Chinese Communist civil transports flew to Hanoi from Canton, Kunming, and Hankow respectively on 16 December.

some of the cargo is probably POL which Moscow asked Peiping on 14 December to send to Hanoi for purposes of refueling the IL-14s engaged in the airlift. Moscow informed Peiping that the fuel shipment was necessary because "our fuel is delayed en route," and stated it would compensate Peiping.

Personnel evacuated from Vientiane report that Kong Le's artillery and mortar fire has been very accurate and that the destruction of US installations appeared deliberate. The accuracy of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao artillery and mortar fire tends to substantiate earlier reports of the arrival of North Vietnamese gunners in Laos. Phoumi's Radio Savannakhet has claimed the capture of "some" North Vietnamese soldiers.

In Vientiane, one of Phoumi's commanders claims that commando elements under Major Siho have occupied the airfield to the northwest of the town. Other Phoumi elements are continuing their efforts to clear the town itself of remaining pockets of resistance. The whereabouts of Captain Kong Le and the bulk of his retreating force is unknown; they may link up with Pathet Lao elements in outlying districts of Vientiane Province, where together the two forces would pose a continuing threat to Vientiane.

TOP SECRET

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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

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